Justia Lawyer Rating for Robert D. Kreisman

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Many truck accidents are caused by truck driver fatigue. There are new federal restrictions on the number of hours a driver can be in service under the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), which created the hours-of-service rules. Under these new rules, a driver is limited with respect to how long he or she may drive a commercial motor vehicle without a break. 

Truck accidents and truck driver fatigue are linked based on many years of study. The Interstate Commerce Commission began limiting hours in which a commercial truck driver could operate a truck beginning in 1937.Recently, the Department of Transportation (DOT) has emphasized the need to limit the hours that a truck driver may drive without a break. 

The purpose behind the revised regulations deals with the connection between truck driver fatigue and accidents on the highways. It is well known that a driver who has driven for many hours is at greater risk of a crash than one without extended hours on the road.

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Anthony Williams filed a lawsuit against BNSF Railway Co. under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) (45 U.S.C. §51) (2006) claiming an employment-related injury. BNSF filed a third-party complaint for contribution and contractual indemnification against third-party defendant Quality Terminal Services (QTS). At the jury trial, a verdict in favor of Williams was returned with total damages in the amount of $2,676,950. However, the jury assigned 50 percent of the negligence in the case to Williams and divided the remaining responsibility at 37.5 percent to BNSF and 12.5 percent to QTS. The jury also returned a verdict in favor of QTS on BNSF’s contractual indemnity claim.

BNSF appealed claiming that the circuit court erred in denying its motion for a directed verdict on the contractual indemnity claim. BNSF also maintained that the trial judge erred in refusing to allow evidence related to Williams’s termination of employment with BNSF. And finally, BNSF contended that the circuit court erred in allowing evidence of the loss of household services, including unsupported opinion testimony regarding the value of those services. 

At the outset, Williams and QTS argued that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to decide this appeal because BNSF did not file its notice of appeal within 30 days of the trial court’s oral ruling on all posttrial motion. Williams filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and QTS joined. The appellate court noted that in Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 237 Ill. 2d. 217, 251-52 (2010), the reviewing court has a duty to consider its jurisdiction and to dismiss the appeal if it determines that jurisdiction is wanting. 

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John Baugh sustained a severe brain injury when the Cuprum ladder that he was using to clean his gutters buckled and collapsed. Baugh’s wife Sharon filed a lawsuit on his behalf against Cuprum S.A.de C.V. claiming that the defective design and the manufacturer’s negligence was the cause of her husband’s injuries.  John could not testify as to what happened to him because of his injuries.

About three months before the beginning of the trial, the defendant, Cuprum, informed plaintiff’s attorney that it intended to use an exemplar of the actual ladder at the jury trial. The exemplar ladder was new, but had been built to the exact specifications to the ladder that Baugh had used. In a pretrial conference on Feb. 1, 2011, Cuprum’s exemplar ladder was marked as an exhibit “for Demonstrative Purposes.”  The plaintiff’s counsel objected to any use of the new exemplar ladder at trial. Discovery had been closed for two years. The ladder had not been included in Cuprum’s expert disclosures. 

In response to the objection, Cuprum argued that the exemplar ladder was for demonstrative purposes and that it would be used during direct examination of its expert witness. It was not intended to be substantive evidence.  Cuprum also argued that the exemplar ladder would be used to demonstrate and help the jury understand the expert’s testimony. 

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The Illinois Appellate Court has affirmed a partial summary judgment order for a defendant in a head-on crash and death case.  This case arose out of a collision in which the car driven by Jeffrey Pister was struck head-on by an employee of the defendant, Matrix Service Industrial Contractors.  At the time of the crash in April 2009, the Matrix driver, Brian Stultz, was nearing his destination in Champaign, Ill.  Stultz was scheduled to work there later that morning for Matrix. Stultz and Jeffrey Pister were killed in the collision.

Jeffrey’s widow, Tisha Pister, filed a third-amended complaint against Matrix and the Estate of Brian Stultz.  The Estate of Stultz was not part of the appeal.

In the lawsuit, the Pister family claimed that Matrix was liable for Jeffrey’s death under the doctrine of respondeat superior.  Pister asserted two theories:  (1) Brian was a “traveling employee” of Matrix, on which the court, before the trial granted summary judgment for Matrix, and (2) Brian was on a “special errand” for Matrix at the time of the crash. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Matrix on Pister’s “special errand” theory.

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In an Illinois Appellate Court decision, it was found that a trust’s beneficiaries had sufficient minimum contact with the state simply through their ownership interest of a trust administered by an Illinois resident.

In May 2012, a Cook County associate court judge dismissed the trust dispute case for lack of jurisdiction. 

The trial judge had relied on an opinion that lacked precedential value that undermined that court’s holding, so said the opinion of appellate court Justice Robert E. Gordon. The Illinois Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s ruling dismissing the case.

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On Aug. 31, 2009, the plaintiff, Juan Zamora, filed a lawsuit alleging negligence against the defendants for injuries he suffered.  A lawsuit was filed against defendants Cheri and Paul Payne. On March 24, 2010, that lawsuit was dismissed because it was barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act and included an Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) finding. On April 23, 2010, Zamora filed a motion to reconsider the dismissal. On June 29, 2009, the trial judge allowed the defendants leave to file a third-party complaint seeking contribution against Ricardo Montiel, Newsboy Delivery Systems,

Inc. and Unique Distribution Services, Inc.

On July 11, 2012, more than two years after the Paynes filed their third-party claim, the trial court dismissed the Payne defendants’ contribution claim. On that date, Zamora asked the trial judge to make a new Rule 304(a) finding with respect to the March 24, 2010 dismissal order. On July 24, 2012, Zamora filed a notice of appeal regarding the March 24, 2010 dismissal order and the subsequent denial of his motion to reconsider.  On May 14, 2013, the trial judge dismissed all remaining causes of action directed against the Payne defendants. On June 5, 2013, Zamora filed the notice of appeal initiating the current appeal seeking reversal of the March 24, 2010 dismissal and the March 20, 2013 denial of his motion to renew the March 2010 Rule 304(a) finding.

 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) allows for the appeal of a final judgment in a case involving multiple claims or parties where the judgment concerns “one or more but fewer than all of the parties or claims.” To allow for a judgment to be appealed under the Rule, the trial court must make a finding that “there is no just reason for delaying either enforcement or appeal or both.”  Ill.S.Ct.R. 304(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2006).

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On Sept. 24, 2006, the car being driven by Keisha Geans, who was driving while under the influence of alcohol, crashed into a concrete barrier, overturned and collided with the Miranda family car. Marco Miranda, who was 12, was left permanently disabled after suffering a serious brain injury. Geans’ blood alcohol level was .229, which is almost three times the legal limit.  Geans pleaded guilty to fourth-degree aggravated driving under the influence. The Miranda family sued for their injuries.

On Dec. 12, 2008, Universal Insurance Co., Geans’ insurer, paid the Miranda family the policy limits of $20,000. In return, the Miranda family released all claims against Geans and Universal. After the settlement was finalized, the Miranda family then filed an amended complaint adding the Walsh Group, a construction company. That was filed on Nov. 29, 2010. The Miranda family sued Walsh for negligence, alleging that the concrete barrier it placed on the side of the road was done negligently and was a contributing cause of the crash.

The Miranda family also then sued for contribution  against Geans, alleging that Geans’ driving was a proximate cause of Marco Miranda’s injuries. Geans moved to dismiss claiming that the settlement had ended any liability as to her.

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The Missouri Supreme Court is considering whether the “baseball rule” applies to an eye injury caused accidentally by the Kansas City Royals’ mascot Sluggerrr, who flung a foil-wrapped hot dog that struck the left eye of John Coomer. Although this seemingly harmless act would ordinarily be of no consequence, the foiled hot dog hit the left eye of Mr. Coomer, requiring two eye surgeries.  He has a serious eye injury today with vision deficit. 

The “baseball rule” is a legal standard that protects sports teams from being sued over fan injuries caused by events on the field.  The issue in this case, now pending a decision before the Missouri Supreme Court, is whether the rule would apply to injuries caused by a mascot or other personnel the teams employ to entertain sports fans.

The case was first before a Jackson County, Mo., jury two years ago. The jury sided with the Royals, stating that Coomer was completely at fault for his injury because he wasn’t aware of what was going on around him. However, on appeal, the jury’s verdict was overturned; the ruling stated that although being struck by a baseball is an inherent risk fans assume at games, being hit in the face and eye by a hot dog is not one of those.

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On Aug. 29, 2010, Rachel Deglman was driving eastbound on Wellington Avenue when southbound defendant Brittney Gurrola, 18, did not stop at the stop sign at Natchez Avenue in Chicago. Gurrola’s car entered the intersection and crashed into Deglman’s vehicle.

There was no stop sign for oncoming traffic on Wellington Avenue. Deglman, 23, who was a student, maintained that the impact caused her to suffer herniated discs at C5-6 and C6-7 with associated cervical radiculopathy. 

Gurrola claimed that Deglman was speeding and was contributory negligent for her own injuries. Gurrola also argued at the trial that Deglman was not injured to the extent that she claimed, and some of her medical treatment was not necessary. The jury’s verdict of $34,752 was reduced by 5 percent for the contributory negligence that it found to be attributable to Deglman. The verdict of $33,014 was made up of the following damage

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On Aug. 12, 2009, Jaime Lindsey’s vehicle was stopped on northbound Hawthorne Road (Route 59) awaiting a red light at Dundee Road in Barrington Hills, Ill.  At that point, the defendant Stephen Pernal lost control of his car while turning from Dundee Road (Route 68) onto southbound Hawthorne;  his car collided with Lindsey’s vehicle in a head-on impact. Lindsey is a 17-year-old student.  She sustained a medial meniscus tear in her right knee, which required surgery. 

The defendant argued at the trial that the torn meniscus came from  Lindsey’s long dancing career and was not related to the collision because it was not diagnosed until March 2011, almost two years after the crash.

The jury, however, had a different opinion.  The jury’s verdict of $51,361 was made up of the following damages:

  • $27,361 for medical expenses; and 
  • $24,000 for pain and suffering.

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