Justia Lawyer Rating for Robert D. Kreisman

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In February 2009, Valerie Mobley’s Subaru developed transmission problems. Mobley found Best Transmissions, which acted as a broker and referred auto repair jobs to various repair shops. Mobley called the number listed on the website that she found and spoke to a salesman who told her that a neighborhood shop would do the repair work and that no work would be done without a prior estimate and customer authorization. Mobley was told that no charges would be assessed unless she decided to go elsewhere for the work.

Mobley received an e-mail that contained an agreement for authorization for the work on her car. The agreement listed the price not involving “hard parts” as $1,397. The next day a tow truck came and took the Subaru without telling her where the vehicle was being taken.

Mobley called Best Transmissions again and an employee there gave her the number of the repair shop. The repair shop was called Tramco and was located nearly 30 miles from her home. When Mobley called Tramco she was directed back to Best Transmissions. Mobley was told that Best Transmissions was the customer of Tramco, not Mobley.

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Attorneys should be aware that corporations can be deposed by authority of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 206. In Illinois, a deposition notice pursuant to that Supreme Court rule would require the corporate party or government entity to designate and produce for deposition a witness to give testimony at a discovery deposition on behalf of the corporation with respect to the facts set out in the notice of deposition. This would be the person most knowledgeable about the corporation and those relevant facts. The corporation would be obliged to produce one or more of its officers, directors, agents, employees or other persons who have knowledge on the subject matter of the inquiry.

The Illinois Supreme Court rule is similar to the Federal Rule 30(b)(6). A designated representative who gives testimony under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 206(a) may not be contradicted by any other corporate representative at trial. SCR 206(a)(1) also grants subpoena power to depose a corporate representative who is a non-party to the case. In the subpoena it should be explained what the subject matter of the deposition would be; what matters known are reasonably available to the corporation should be made available at the deposition.

The corporate representative’s testimony is binding on the company. Testimony given at a deposition may be considered a party admission that precludes the corporation or a party in the lawsuit from contesting the essential elements of its claims or defenses later on in the litigation. In some cases, the corporate representative with the most knowledge may be a former employee of the corporation, partnership or entity.

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A BP gas station was having its above-ground storage tank filled with gasoline by a petroleum company and its driver. David Cowles, 61, was the delivery driver for a petroleum company filling the storage tank at the BP gas station when one of the tanks overflowed. The gasoline vapors ignited and a massive explosion erupted. Cowles suffered second and third-degree burns, including severe burns to his arms. He was hospitalized for weeks in a burn unit and required multiple debridement and skin-graft surgical procedures.

Cowles filed a lawsuit against the company that owned the gasoline station, claiming that it had chosen not to use an accurate method for measuring its gasoline inventory. Usually underground gasoline tanks are measured by a long stick inserted in the tank opening to determine the gasoline levels.

During the discovery process of the case, Cowles learned that the gas station calculated its inventory using “net volume” method, which is used in the industry for purchasing gasoline; it is determined by the volume of gas at 60 degrees Fahrenheit. Gasoline expands with heat.

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On Oct. 29, 2008, Jonas Zigmantas was driving a flatbed truck for trucking company A.V., Inc. The truck was traveling northbound on Illinois Interstate 294 around 9:30 p.m. Zigmantas stopped his truck because he was involved in a minor property damage crash with a Honda Accord, which was driven by Michael Hawkins, near mile marker 2.

The Accord had sideswiped Zigmantas’s truck. Instead of pulling the flatbed semi-trailer over to the shoulder of the four-lane highway, Zigmantas stopped in the third lane of traffic, got out of his cab to check damage to his truck, walked to the shoulder to see if Hawkins was injured and told him to call the police.

After some time out of the truck, Zigmantas got back in, but he did not move the truck to the side of the road or put out any reflective hazard warning triangles or flares behind his parked flatbed trailer.

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The 7th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals in Chicago has affirmed a decision dismissing a copyright claim brought by Catherine Conrad, who was a self-employed singing and dancing entertainer. Conrad calls herself the “Banana Lady” and performs wearing a costume in the shape of a giant banana.

Conrad was hired by several credit unions to perform a “singing telegram” at a credit union trade association event. Conrad claimed that she told the arrangers that members of the audience were not to take photos or video of her performing except for their own personal use. The exception to the rule that she imposed was that postings on Facebook pages would be allowed.

In Conrad’s pro se lawsuit brought against the credit union, she alleged that the organizers did not inform the audience of these restrictions until after she completed her performance. As a result, she claimed several audience members took photos and videos during the performance and posted them to the Internet.

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A Cook County jury entered a $4,268 jury verdict for Jonathan Mischo, who was riding his bicycle eastbound on Belle Plaine Avenue in Chicago when he was struck by the car driven by the defendant, Dawit Tekeste, who was driving a southbound taxi cab at the intersection of Belle Plaine and Clarendon.  Mischo suffered a sprained left wrist and aggravation of chronic headaches. Tekeste maintained that Mischo was traveling through a stop sign, didn’t stop and entered the intersection when the collision took place.

The attorney for Mischo, Bryan O’Connor Jr., asked the jury to return a verdict of $117,000.  The offer to settle the case before trial was $4,500.

The jury’s verdict of $8,535 was reduced by 50%, which the jury found was the contributory negligence of Mischo.  The total verdict of $4,268 was made up of the following damages:

  • $4,268 for medical expenses.

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The Illinois Appellate Court has affirmed in part and reversed in part a case dealing with an insurer’s duty to defend an insured.

In this case, Hilco, an Illinois corporation, had four related companies. They are Hilco Trading, and its three majority-owned subsidiaries, Hilco Appraisal, Hilco Valuation and Hilco Financial LLC.

Hilco Trading purchased a professional liability insurance policy from the Liberty Surplus Insurance Corp. The insurance policy provided a limit of $10 million in excess of the $250,000 deductible and required Liberty to defend Hilco if it were sued for any wrongful act regarding its professional services. In addition, Hilco bought a similar policy from Illinois Union, providing an additional $10 million limit beyond the Liberty policy.

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F. Gary Kovac, the plaintiff in this matter, sued the estate of Kenneth L. Barron Jr. for compensatory damages and exemplary or punitive damages. In the majority of jurisdictions, punitive damages are not allowed after the death of the defendant tortfeasor.

Kovac and Barron owned 50% of three different corporations. In his original lawsuit, Kovac accused Barron of a pattern of serious misconduct, which included diverting millions of dollars from the businesses. Kovac sued Barron in Kane County, Ill. When Barron died, Kovac continued the lawsuit against the administrator of Barron’s estate who was his widow, Sandra Barron.

At the end of the bench trial, the trial judge ordered Barron’s estate to pay $3,220,702 for fraud and an additional $450,000 in punitive damages.

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James Fregeau was involved in two different and separate motor vehicle crashes.  Both cases were consolidated for discovery and trial.  The first crash took place on April 22, 2009 when a car driven by the defendant, Anthony Foster, rear-ended a vehicle, which then pushed into Fregeau’s car, injuring him.

The second crash took place on Dec. 4, 2010, when the car driven by defendant Dina Whittier rear-ended Fregeau’s car on southbound Interstate 57 near 167th Street in Markham, Ill.   In that case, both cars spun out and a second impact with each other occurred.

Fregeau, 27, claimed that he suffered spinal sprains and an aggravation of facet joint arthropathy,  which required emergency room visits, doctor visits, CT scans, MRIs, bone scans, physical therapy, chiropractic treatment, facet blocks and future facet ablations.

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The plaintiff, Michigan Indiana Condominium Association, is a 119-unit residential condominium complex (the “Complex”).  Optima was the general contractor and selected a variety of subcontractors to do the construction work.  Construction was completed in June 2002.  One of the contractors was Jenni and Loucon.  Loucon was the masonry contractor.  On Sept. 2, 2003, Loucon was dissolved as an Illinois corporation.  Jenni was likewise dissolved on Jan. 1, 2006.

In the spring of 2010, the plaintiffs discovered latent defects in the Complex.  On Aug. 29, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a complaint for damages against Optima and other defendants.  Plaintiffs sought damages under breach of implied warranty of habitability and breach of implied warranty of good workmanship.  Optima added as third-party defendants Jenni and Loucon as well as others.  Optima alleged breach of contract and breach of implied warranties against Jenni and Loucon.  Optima sought indemnification and contribution.  Because both corporations had been dissolved, Optima served its notice upon the Secretary of State pursuant to Section 5.25 of the Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1983 (805 ILCS 5/1.01 et seq.)

Jenni and Loucon moved jointly to dismiss Optima’s third-party complaint pursuant to Section 2-615(a)(5) and (a)(9) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure.  Jenni and Loucon argued that since the third-party action against them was initiated more than 5 years after their dissolution (it was 6 years and 3 months after Jenni’s dissolution and 8 years and 8 months after Loucon’s dissolution), the Illinois Secretary of State was not authorized to act as the dissolved corporation’s agent under the Act.  Accordingly, they argued that service of summons on each was improper, and the court lacked personal jurisdiction.  On Nov. 29, 2012, the Circuit Court judge granted Jenni’s and Loucon’s joint motion to dismiss and dismissed them with prejudice. This appeal was taken by Optima.

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