Articles Posted in Illinois Civil Procedure

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The Rev. Timothy O’Malley and William O’Malley were two of Eileen O’Malley’s sons. In 1996, Eileen O’Malley experienced the first signs of dementia. The same year, Eileen and Timothy opened a joint checking account with First Midwest Bank Corp.

Eileen instructed that the account statements be sent to the Palos Country Club, a family asset managed by William O’Malley. Timothy never saw the account statements and so had no way of knowing that it contained almost $5 million in February 2004 and that by February 2009, there was less than $100,000 in the account. William had withdrawn the rest.

William, with two of his siblings, developed a plan “to defraud their 8 siblings and Eileen so that [they] would control Eileen’s assets.” To accomplish that, they had Eileen sign documents, including “wills, trust agreements and checks which did not reflect Eileen’s wishes.”

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On June 20, 2010, Delores Franklin and Todd Gryczewski were in an automobile crash. Slightly more than two years later, on June 12, 2012, Gryczewski sued Franklin for injuries he suffered in that crash. Franklin died on Nov. 24, 2011. Gryczewski had no knowledge of his death at the time of the filing.

About two weeks later, a law firm appeared on Franklin’s behalf and filed a motion to appoint a special administrator. Bob Phillip was appointed special administrator on July 17, 2012.

On June 23, 2014, Phillip filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit. Phillip argued that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the named defendant, Franklin, was dead. Phillip also argued that the suit had fallen beyond the statute of limitations because it failed to satisfy the requirements needed to file a lawsuit against a deceased person. The court agreed and dismissed the case with prejudice. Gryczewski appealed.

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In the majority opinion given in a substitution of judge denial and subsequent appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court held that the denial of a motion for substitution of judge for cause is not a final order. The court cited the case of In re Marriage of Nettleton, 348 Ill.App.3d 961 (2004). Instead the court stated that it is an interlocutory order that is appealable on review from a final order.

In this case, the HOB I Holding Corp. and the Eva Buziecki Trust appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court when its request for a substitution of judge as a matter of right under Section 2-1001(a)(2) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure was denied. The moving parties relied on Rule 304(a) finding that there was no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of that March 27, 2014 order denying the request for substitution of judge.

The majority opinion – noting “it is well-settled law that the mere inclusion of a Rule 304(a) finding in a non-final order does not make the order appealable under the Supreme Court rules and concluded that Rule 304(a) did not provide this court with jurisdiction because the March 27, 2014, order denying a substitution of judge did not ‘become’ a final order simply by including the statutory language.”

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Under the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure §2-203.1 “Service by Special Order of Court” is allowed if it is impractical to serve someone (a defendant) at his or her place of abode. In that case, the court can direct a comparable method of service in any manner consistent with the process.

A motion to serve someone under Section 2-203.1 requires the movant to provide an affidavit that includes a specific statement that a “diligent inquiry as to the location of the individual” was made. Failure to make a diligent inquiry can result in improper service.

In the case of Sutton v. Ekong, a default judgment was entered in the amount of $199,998.32 because the defendant had defaulted after allegedly been served properly through the Secretary of State of Illinois. Many attempts had been made on the defendant to serve him with summons at his home and by use of a special process server without success. After failing to appear in court, the plaintiff then served the defendant through the Illinois Secretary of State. The court allowed this after the plaintiff asked the trial court for process of service in that fashion.

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The plaintiff Michael Hawkins signed a release when he purchased a gym membership from X-Sport Fitness, which is owned by Capital Fitness Inc. The release document did not expressly cover the unusual hazard of falling mirrors, which occurred at the Chicago facility when a 3-foot by 8-foot mirror fell from a wall protrusion and struck Hawkins on the head while he was performing arm curls at X-Sport’s Logan Square facility. It was alleged that the mirror fell on Hawkins because X-Sport’s employees chose not to properly secure it.

The release document that was signed by Hawkins stated in all capital letters that Hawkins accepted “all risks of injury from using the gym’s equipment and facility”; agreed to hold the company and its affiliates harmless from any injury caused by negligent acts and omissions “arising out of or in any way related to the member’s presence and/or use of the facility”; and released all claims for personal injury that might be caused by improper maintenance of any “exercise equipment or facilities.”

On the basis of that release and its language, the trial judge granted Capital Fitness’s motion for summary judgment in its favor. The Illinois Appellate Court reversed stating that “Because an exculpatory clause is strictly construed against the party it benefits, the clause must identify the range of dangers for which risk of injury is being assumed.” The court added, “We are unable to hold, as a matter of law, that a falling mirror is a danger within the scope of the exculpatory clause.”

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On Sept. 9, 2008, the plaintiff, Kevin Burkhamer, was injured when he was struck by a car driven by the defendant, Mel Richard Krumske. Burkhamer filed a lawsuit against Krumske claiming that he injured his hip, elbow, shoulder, left hand, neck and back. Burkhamer was employed as an ironworker and excavator. The plaintiff’s total medical bills were just under $45,000.

At the jury trial, the defendant Krumske admitted negligence and did not attend the trial. During direct examination of Burkhamer, he was asked if he ever had a conversation with the defendant. After the plaintiff responded no, the defendant’s lawyer objected. The trial judge sustained the objection on the basis of relevance. The plaintiff then was asked if he was aware that defendant had admitted negligence just before trial. When the plaintiff answered yes, the trial court sustained defendant’s objection and ordered the jury to “disregard the mention of the timeline.” The plaintiff Burkhamer was then asked if the defendant called him to apologize. Defense counsel objected on the basis of relevance, and the trial court granted his request for a sidebar.

At the sidebar, the defense counsel argued that the plaintiff’s line of questioning was designed to inflame the jury and moved for a mistrial. The court agreed that the line of questioning was improper and sustained the objection trial and the judge took the motion for mistrial under advisement. “I’m going to let us proceed and then we will. I’ll be able to determine this, of course the point is cited at the present. However, it may be possible that future conduct would be an appropriate consideration on my ruling on this motion . . .”

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The Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District has reversed a Lake County, Ill., dismissal of a personal-injury and wrongful-death claim against Rene Melbourn who was dismissed on motion under the Illinois Code of Civil Procedures, Section 2-615, for failure to state a cause of action. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal with prejudice of their second amendment complaint against Melbourn. The trial judge had found that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for wrongful-death based on an “in-concert” theory of liability and the negligent infliction of emotional distress. Melbourn was the only defendant involved in the appeal.

The facts of the case were that on Dec. 13, 2013, the Borcia family, including Antonio Borcia, was out boating and tubing on Lake County’s Chain of Lakes. The defendant, Melbourn, was sued along with David Hatyina, Spring Lake Marina Ltd. and Fox Waterway Agency over the death of Antonio. In this boating accident, which killed Antonio, it was alleged that Melbourn was liable for in-concert liability for the wrongful death as well as negligent infliction of emotional distress for a bystander who witnessed the collision.

The incident involved Hatyina’s 29-foot cigarette boat, named “Purple Haze,” which struck and killed Antonio on Petite Lake, in Lake Villa, Ill. Melbourn was a passenger on the boat; it was alleged she contributed to Hatyina’s consumption of alcohol and cocaine. Hatyina was impaired as he operated the boat at speeds in excess of 40 mph. Hatyina struck Antonio with the boat. Antonio suffered severe injuries that resulted in his death on July 28, 2012.

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Cook County has the largest single unified court system in the United States. For the first time, on Jan. 5, 2015, the Circuit Court of Cook County began allowing media cameras in courtrooms. The pilot program has limited to the Leighton Criminal Court building at 26th and California streets in Chicago.

In order to take photographs or film in a Cook County courtroom, the media would have to request authority in advance. The privilege to photograph or videotape court proceedings was initiated by the Illinois Supreme Court’s Extended Media Coverage (EMC) policy and the court’s authorization, which extended media coverage in Illinois courts; it is referred to as M.R 2634.

The pilot program is designed to allow for increased transparency in the Cook County court system.

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In 1986, Nina Willoughby operated a small business in which she sold retail clothes in a rented store. That year, she and Louis Fideli took out a $315,000 loan and purchased the store with other properties. The store property was kept solely in Fideli’s name. However, in 2003, Willoughby missed several mortgage payments; in 2004, the bank sued and foreclosed on her shop.

Fideli made Willoughby co-owner and then sole owner of the property after which she received a loan of $577,000 from the refinancing. John Heffron helped Willoughby with the transaction. Fideli received no compensation for transferring the property to Willoughby. The property was valued at $1.2 million in a loan application.

In June 2006, Fideli filed a lawsuit against Willoughby claiming that she had promised to repay him 50% interest in the property once she had avoided the foreclosure action. He charged her with unjust enrichment.

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The Illinois appellate court has reinstated a product-liability lawsuit against a distributor in which there was a default judgment against the manufacturer of the product. In this case, the manufacturer was not subject to jurisdiction, and the plaintiff wasn’t able to satisfy the judgment. Nevertheless, the court ruled that the plaintiff may reinstate the lawsuit against the distributor.

In 2009, Jeff Chraca was unpacking a shipment of golf cart batteries. Chraca was employed by Chicago Battery Co. Chraca was lifting and carrying the batteries with the aid of a black strap that came with the shipment of batteries. The strap broke suddenly and Chraca wrenched one of his shoulders and his neck.

Chraca filed a worker’s compensation claim in 2011 and then filed a strict tort product-liability action against U.S. Battery — the company that sent the batteries and the strap to Chraca’s employer. However, U.S. Battery did not manufacture the strap; instead, it merely sent it along with the battery shipment.

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